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Agriculture's `multifunctionality' and the WTO
{
Kym Anderson*
Are the agricultural policy reforms embodied in the Uruguay Round consistent
with meeting domestic policy objectives such as providing adequate food security,
environmental protection and viability of rural areas? This article examines the
claim that agriculture deserves more price support and import protection than
other sectors because of the non-marketed externalities and public goods it
produces jointly with marketable food and ¢bre (agriculture's so-called `multi-
functionality'). Do these unrewarded positive externalities exceed the negative
externalities from farming by more than the net positive externalities produced by
other sectors? To what extent are those farmer-produced spillovers under-supplied,
and what are the most e¤cient ways to boost their production to the socially
optimal levels? The article concludes that there is little trade-o¡ required to meet
domestic policy objectives on the one hand and agricultural protection reform
objectives as embodied in WTO rules on the other.
1. Introduction
A major achievement of the Uruguay Round was to begin to bring more
rules-based GATT discipline to agricultural trade and trade-related policies.
The Round's Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) requires all (other than
quarantine) non-tari¡ barriers to agricultural imports to be eliminated (and
replaced by bound tari¡s or ceiling bindings and in some cases tari¡ rate
quotas); for bound tari¡s to be scheduled for phased reductions; and for
farm production subsidies (`domestic support') and export subsidies also to
be reduced. Industrial countries are implementing those reforms between
1995 and 2000, while developing countries have until 2004. That URAA,
together with the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (to
limit the use of quarantine import restrictions to cases that can be justi¢ed
scienti¢cally), the new policy noti¢cation and review requirements, and the
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of resolving trade con£icts), ensure that agricultural trade will be less chaotic
in future than prior to the transformation in 1995 of the GATT into the
new World Trade Organization (WTO).
Path-breaking though these Uruguay Round achievements have been,
much remains to be done before international agricultural trade is as fully
disciplined or as free as world trade in manufactures. It is true that the rate
of producer assistance derived from agricultural policies in OECD countries
fell in the middle half of the 1990s. However, in 1997 it still added about 50
per cent to what would otherwise be the value of farm production, and the
consumer tax equivalent on farm products is about 35 per cent.
1 Since then,
support levels have risen further as international food prices fell in the wake
of East Asia's ¢nancial crisis. The rate of assistance to agriculture remains
many times higher than that for manufacturing, as the average OECD tari¡
on manufactures is now less than 5 per cent. Because of this huge di¡erence
in the rates of protection between the two sectors and the modesty of the
URAA reforms, it was agreed as part of the URAA to return to the
multilateral trade negotiating table by the end of 1999, preparatory work for
which began in 1997.
One item that has gathered considerable attention in some OECD
countries, as they move into the next round of WTO negotiations on
agriculture, has to do with the term `non-trade concerns'.
2 The term appears
in Article 20(c) of the URAA, where WTO members have agreed that, in
negotiating the continuation of the agricultural policy reform process after
1999, `non-trade concerns' will be taken into account. While not spelt out in
any detail, the preamble to the URAA de¢nes those concerns to include
security of food supplies and protection of the environment. A third concern,
the viability of rural areas, has also been mentioned by Norway in the past
1The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) can be calculated from the OECD's estimate of
the producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) where NRA  1=1 ÿ PSE ÿ 1. Likewise the
consumer tax equivalent (CTE) can be calculated from the OECD's consumer subsidy
equivalent (CSE) where CTE  ÿCSE=1 ÿ PSE. Based on the PSEs estimated by the
OECD (1998c), the average NRA for the OECD has fallen from 64 to 52 per cent over the
decade to 1997, while the CTE has fallen from 51 to 35 per cent. About three-¢fths of the
NRA came from direct market price support via trade instruments in 1997, down from four-
¢fths a decade earlier.
2See, for example, the Chairman's report from the September 1998 analysis and in-
formation exchange meeting of the WTO's Committee of Agriculture (WTO 1998), which
cites informal papers on this issue that were provided by no less than nine countries.
Submissions to the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (e.g., Norwegian
Government 1999) also are relevant. Since then, the OECD's Committee for Agriculture
and its Trade Committee considered a series of four comprehensive background papers on
the issue (OECD 2000).
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following their meeting in Paris, 5^6 March 1998.
3 The governments
discussing these three items are characterising them as providing positive
externalities and in some cases public goods that are jointly produced along
with food and ¢bre.
4 Hence the word `multifunctionality' has been coined to
describe these features of agricultural production.
This article seeks to address three questions raised by these concerns. First,
to what extent are the agricultural policy reforms embodied in the URAA
consistent with meeting domestic policy objectives such as providing ad-
equate degrees of food security, environmental protection and viability of
rural areas; second, if and where the URAA reforms are countering those
goals, what domestic policy actions and/or WTO rules changes are appro-
priate; and third, how might any such changes compromise the objective of
reducing interventions in world food markets?
In the process of addressing these questions, the article examines the claim
that agriculture deserves more price support and/or import protection than
other sectors because of the non-marketed externalities/public goods it
produces jointly in the process of producing marketable food and ¢bre. Do
these unrewarded positive externalities exceed the negative externalities from
farming by more than the net positive externalities produced by other
sectors? If so, to what extent if any are those farmer-produced externalities
under-supplied? And where there is under-provision, what are the most
e¤cient ways to boost their production to the socially optimal levels?
The article begins by asking why `non-trade' concerns are being raised in
the WTO forum at this time. The next section then addresses `non-trade
concerns' in general, before attention is turned to each of the three speci¢c
concerns mentioned above.
5 The article ¢nishes with a summary of its con-
clusions. Throughout, the agricultural reforms being referred to include not
3The Communique ¨ states, among other things, that: `Beyond its primary function of
supplying food and ¢bre, agricultural activity can also shape the landscape, provide
environmental bene¢ts such as land conservation, the sustainable management of renewable
natural resources and the preservation of bio-diversity, and contribute to the viability of
many rural areas.'
4A positive externality is a non-marketed net bene¢t that farmers bestow on the rest of
society. A negative externality is de¢ned in a similar but opposite way. A public good (or
service) is one which, when produced, provides bene¢ts that involve non-excludability (that
is, one cannot stop a person enjoying it) and non-rivalry (that is, its enjoyment by one
person need not detract from another's enjoyment of that good or service).
5Other concerns also have been raised from time to time by individual countries but, for
the sake of brevity and because they worry fewer countries, they will be ignored in this
article.
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forms of domestic support as in the URAA which, collectively, are lowering
government support for farm production in protective OECD countries.
2. Why are `non-trade' concerns being raised in the WTO at this time?
It is not surprising that the WTO is being confronted with these agricultural
`non-trade' concerns. They are, after all, simply a subset of domestic policy
issues that are interfacing increasingly with international policies as the
globalisation of the world economy proceeds. The very success of the
GATT/WTO in reducing traditional barriers to trade, together with falling
costs of transport and communications between countries (themselves partly
induced by policy reforms), have raised the relative importance of domestic
economic and social policies in determining the international competitiveness
of di¡erent industries. Because the gradual outlawing of traditional trade
measures is encouraging interest groups to seek government assistance by
other (usually domestic) policy measures, the WTO is having to focus
increasingly on at least the more trade-related of those domestic measures.
Environmental standards and competition policy are but two recent
examples. To ensure consistency across sectors, the latter domestic trade-
related policy issues are best dealt with by the WTO in a general rather than
in a sector-speci¢c way. This is true also for the `non-trade' concerns raised
in this article with respect to agriculture, not least because similar issues arise
to varying extents in other sectors too.
3. Some general points on agriculture's multifunctionality
The current debate over so-called `non-trade concerns' is similar to the
debate early in the Uruguay Round about so-called `non-economic ob-
jectives' of agricultural policy.
6 As in that earlier debate, no one is denying
that national governments have the sovereign right to determine their own
policy objectives or goals. Nor is it denied that there may be numerous goals
that agricultural policies seek to achieve over and above the production of
6The adjective `so-called' is used because the concerns are in fact trade-related and they
de¢nitely have economic content. That earlier debate led to a thorough analysis of the issue
by the OECD in the late 1980s, one outcome being a detailed paper by Winters (1990).
The standard economic theory underlying the analysis of policies aimed at maximising social
welfare in the presence of market failures such as externalities and public goods is covered
in a 1974 book by Max Corden. That seminal book has recently been revised and updated to
include, among other things, a full chapter on environment and trade policy (Corden
1997). Those studies in turn built on the pioneering work of Pigou (1932) and Meade (1955).
What follows draws directly on that mainstream literature.
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governments strive to achieve their goals, bearing in mind governments'
international rights and obligations and possible market failures due to ex-
ternalities and public goods associated with the production and consumption
of agricultural and other goods and services.
3.1 What lessons can be drawn from policy theory and practice?
Both economic theory and policy practice have taught us at least six lessons
of relevance to the present article. First, where there are several policy
objectives, an equal number of policy instruments typically is required to deal
e¤ciently with them. Second, the most e¤cient/lowest cost policy instrument
or measure for achieving a particular objective (such as overcoming a market
failure) will be that which addresses the concern most directly. Third, trade
measures in particular are rarely the most e¤cient instruments for addressing
`non-trade' concerns. Fourth, trade reform will be welfare-improving so long
as optimal domestic interventions are in place to deal with those `non-trade'
concerns and are appropriately adjusted to remain optimal as trade reform
proceeds (Meade 1955; Corden 1997). Fifth, the extent of achievement of so-
called non-economic objectives may not be as great with as without trade
reform, but that is the nature of optimal trade-o¡s aimed at maximising
national economic welfare. And sixth, whenever governments intervene in a
market, even if it is to overcome a market failure, there is the risk of
government failure ö and that could be more welfare-reducing than the
market failure the intervention is trying to o¡set. Government failure could
occur at the bureaucratic and/or political level: it could result simply from
there being insu¤cient information and analysis available to design an
appropriate intervention (bureaucratic failure); or it could result from
deliberate action at the political level aimed at rewarding particular groups
covertly for their political support, even though that intervention may be
costly to the community at large (Stigler 1975).
Why should governments be concerned about striving for the most
e¤cient way of achieving society's policy objectives? Simply because re-
sources are required to achieve those objectives. Hence the fewer resources
used to achieve one goal, the more there will be available for achieving
others and/or for preserving resources for future generations.
3.2 Do farmers make more of a non-marketed contribution to social welfare
than other producers?
Every productive sector generates both marketed and non-marketed
products. Some of those non-marketed products are considered more
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and preferences change over time and di¡er between countries, so too do
societies' valuations of those non-marketed products. And as technologies,
institutions, policy experiences and market sizes and structures change in the
process of development, so will the scope for being able to market some of
those previously unmarketable products that were jointly produced with each
sector's main products.
For a case to be made that farming should receive more assistance from
government than other sectors, it needs to be demonstrated that agricultural
production not only is a net contributor in terms of externalities and public
goods, but also is more of a net contributor than other sectors and especially
the sectors that would expand if agricultural supports were to shrink.
Demonstrating that is an almost impossible task, given the di¤culties in
obtaining estimates of society's ever-changing (a) evaluation of the myriad
externalities and public goods generated by the economy's various sectors
(the demand curve); and (b) marginal costs of their provision (the supply
curve). Hence the practice by governments of intervening only in the most
obvious situations where a correction is required.
3.3 Where a net non-marketed contribution is considered valuable enough to
intervene, what are the most appropriate form and level of reward?
Even if a clear case could be made for an intervention, the appropriate
measure is unlikely to be import restrictions or output price supports for a
broad range of marketed commodities. Rather, it will be a ¢nely tuned
measure to encourage the optimal extra amount of just the public-good or
external aspect that has been under-supplied (or would be under laissez-
faire). This ¢ne-tuning of policy instruments by a government is analogous
to the ¢ne-tuning of musical instruments by an orchestra or the sharpening
of surgical instruments by a doctor: the more precisely it is done, the better
will be the ¢nal outcome.
The policy task thus involves several steps: to get a sense of society's
willingness to pay for the non-marketable by-product; to determine the most
e¤cient policy instrument for encouraging farmers or others to supply that
by-product for society; and then to determine the optimal level of en-
couragement so as to equate the marginal social bene¢t with the marginal
social cost of that intervention, bearing in mind the risks associated with one
or both forms of government failure identi¢ed above and the country's
international obligations.
On the latter, nulli¢cation or impairment of trade concessions under the
WTO is an obvious possibility when trade-restrictive instruments are used to
achieve non-trade objectives. It is a less obvious but still very real possibility
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encourage output and hence dampen net imports of a product. The question
for WTO members is: to what extent are such domestic measures to be
tolerated?
With these general points in mind, attention now turns to examining the
three speci¢c `non-trade' concerns most commonly raised by some of the
more-protective OECD countries: food security, environmental protection,
and the viability of rural areas.
7
4. Food security
4.1 Isn't food security a consumer issue?
Food security typically refers to a country's capacity to ensure that
everyone always has access to the minimum supply of basic food necessary
for survival. That requires no more than a certain minimum level of income
and savings for all households plus a well-functioning market for staple
foods (and for credit). Agricultural policy measures have virtually no role
in determining the income of the 90 per cent of households that are net
buyers of food in advanced industrial economies, apart from the usually
negative one of requiring them to pay higher taxes to fund agricultural
subsidies.
The role of OECD agricultural policies in determining non-farm house-
holds' capacity to spend that income on food typically also has been a
negative one, in that agricultural policies tend to keep consumer prices of
food above what they would otherwise be, via import restrictions and export
subsidies. On average in OECD countries, consumers have been paying at
least one-third more for their food than they would in the absence of those
countries' agricultural policies (OECD 1998c).
What about the stability of consumer prices? Sometimes a dependence on
food imports is considered undesirable because it could destabilise domestic
food prices or quantities. With respect to prices, for example, when a country
opens up to imports by moving to ad valorem tari¡s or free trade, it will then
transmit £uctuations in international food prices to the domestic market.
Whether those £uctuation are greater under freer trade depends in part on
other countries' insulating policies: the larger the number of countries
insulating their domestic markets, the greater are international price £uctu-
ations. By so making the international market thinner and more volatile,
such policies encourage other countries to follow suit.
7For a more detailed description of these and other multifunctional contributions from
agriculture, see OECD (2000).
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agree collectively to desist ö which is what the URAA sought to achieve.
True, the URAA will not have much of a stabilising impact this decade. This
is because, even though tari¤cation has been achieved, the levels at which
tari¡s have been bound are in many cases well above applied tari¡s (Ingco
1995), and many of those tari¡s are speci¢c rather than ad valorem. That
`dirty' tari¤cation will allow a developed country to vary its applied tari¡s
to achieve domestic price stability (at the expense of exacerbating inter-
national price stability) to the extent of the gap between the bound and
applied rates. Over time, however, as bound rates (or ceiling bindings in the
case of developing countries) are lowered and tari¡ rate quotas expand so
as gradually to become redundant, the scope for such insulation will
diminish.
8
With respect to quantity £uctuations, one concern seems to be that with
seasonal £uctuations there might be shortfalls so that rice, for example,
simply cannot be purchased internationally until the next harvest. Such
situations are very rare in practice, and would be even rarer if (a) more
importing countries relied on international markets on a regular basis
instead of only when they have a domestic crop failure; and (b) exporters
refrained from using the exceptions to GATT Article XI.1 which prohibits
export restrictions other than taxes. One exception is in GATT Article
XI.2(a), which permits temporary quantitative export restrictions to relieve
critical food shortages in an exporting country. But the URAA's Article 12
added some discipline to that provision. Speci¢cally, it requires that due
consideration be given to the e¡ects of such a restriction on WTO members
who are food importers, that such a¡ected members be consulted, and that
the WTO be noti¢ed of the nature and duration of the restriction. Perhaps
even more discipline could be added in the next WTO round. Certainly, if
it were shown that longer-term customers were being served ¢rst and
charged less in years of shortfall, agricultural exporting countries could be
disciplined under GATT Article XIII.1 and required to provide non-
discriminatory access to their basic foodstu¡s. They would be more willing
8Farmers may then face wider income £uctuations, either because a poor season would
be less likely to coincide with higher domestic prices in the absence of insulation, or because
international prices could be less predictable than protected domestic ones. However, crop
insurance markets are available to cope with the former, and forward contract markets for
commodities and currencies are designed to deal with the latter concern of risk-averse
growers. Markets for storing food also can contribute. If some of those markets are poorly
developed (e.g., because they have been crowded out by past price stabilising schemes), the
¢rst-best government action would be to assist their development (e.g., by abolishing any
remaining so-called price stabilising schemes).
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farm price supports.
What about the risk that quantities of imported food available for con-
sumption may fall dramatically because of war? (GATT Article XXI provides
a national security exception to permit export embargoes in times of war or
other emergencies in international relations.) Countries concerned about that
risk can reduce it by choosing to have a diversi¢ed portfolio of foreign
suppliers. The probability of all suppliers placing an embargo simultaneously,
as in a major war, not only is very low but also is inversely related to the
degree of openness. That is, the more economically interdependent the nations
of the world become, the higher the opportunity cost and hence the smaller
the likelihood of them going to war. This is a major, if often understated,
international public good provided by the GATT/WTO, to which agricultural
trade is at last beginning to contribute thanks to the URAA.
Even in the most catastrophic of cases where a country had to rely on just
domestic suppliers for a period, there is substantial scope to survive. Most
people in OECD countries consume far more calories and nutrients than are
necessary for mere survival. Diets could be adjusted to avoid excessive
calori¢c shortfalls, for example by preparing food di¡erently (in particular,
relying less on re¢ned and processed food), by eating a greater proportion of
each animal slaughtered, and by consuming grains and oilseeds directly
rather than indirectly via animal products. Doing that for a short period of
war would be far less welfare-reducing than forcing consumers to pay higher
prices forever just in case there is another world war.
4.2 Don't domestic farmers contribute to food security?
Domestic farmers typically are the major suppliers of food in their country,
so of course they contribute to food security in that sense. In the most cata-
strophic of cases where a country had to rely on just domestic suppliers for
a period, farmers would contribute even more, for example by transferring
some of their resources from livestock to crop production. But in an extreme
embargo situation fuel and chemical imports also would halt, so overall
domestic food production could shrink signi¢cantly given the role of such
products in providing energy, fertiliser and pesticide inputs for agriculture.
Even the skills of the farmers, having used input-intensive techniques for
decades, would be debased in such an input-deprived environment. Thus
national food self-su¤ciency in output terms is by no means synonymous
with food security. On the contrary, in some cases it could be described more
accurately as an illusion, o¡ering a false or at least exaggerated sense of
security.
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There is an extensive literature on means by which to provide food security.
9
If a society were to feel food-insecure under laissez-faire, bearing in mind
the above considerations, then it is necessary to get a sense of its willingness
to pay for more security by various means, and the costs of those insurance
measures. One such measure involves encouraging the holding of food stocks
above those that would be commercially viable ö a public good that is
explicitly allowed for in paragraph 3 of Annex 2 of the URAA (the so-called
`Green Box' items that are exempt for the purpose of calculating the
aggregate measure of domestic support to agriculture). The optimal level of
encouragement is that which boosts stocks so that the marginal social bene¢t
in terms of food security equals the marginal social cost of that intervention.
Costs are non-trivial, however: storage and interest costs and the costs of
spoilage and quality deterioration can amount to more than 20 per cent a
year. The cost part of the calculation also would need to include the risk of
government failure. If greater domestic production capability was considered
by society to be one of the desirable means of boosting food security,
subsidies to agricultural research and training may well be far less costly
than farm product price supports (an outward shift rather than a movement
along the supply curve). This is especially so if import restrictions rather than
direct payments are the means by which prices are supported, since import
restrictions not only support producer prices but also raise consumer
prices.
10 If society were to invest in more than one means of boosting food
security, ¢nding the optimal levels of those respective interventions would
involve adjusting them until the marginal net social rates of return from each
are equated.
9See, for example, the surveys in Chisholm and Tyers (1982) and Peng, Findlay and
Stringer (1997).
10If for some reason the government was only able to use an import restriction, or felt it
had to use one in addition to boosting research, the level of intervention would have to be
less than if a farmer or research producer subsidy was used. This is because the by-product
distortion cost to consumers from the import restriction would have to be traded o¡ against
the perceived social gain from encouraging more domestic production. Calculating that
optimal second-best level of intervention is non-trivial. It varies by commodity because,
among other things, it will be lower the larger the commodity's price elasticity of demand,
the smaller its price elasticity of supply, the smaller the level of self-su¤ciency would be
under free trade, and the smaller the net positive externality provided by producing that
commodity (Britten-Jones, Nettle and Anderson 1987). If society used the self-su¤ciency
ratio as a metric of strategic food security, with the aim of reducing import dependence, an
import tari¡ alone is not optimal; rather, there should be a producer subsidy as well as an
import tari¡ (Nettle, Britten-Jones and Anderson 1997).
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Agriculture inevitably interacts in major ways with the natural environment.
Both agricultural and environmental policies directly a¡ect that interaction,
as do trade and other economic policies and policy reforms (OECD 1998d).
Since support to producer prices fell considerably over the ten years from
1988 to 1997, from 51 to 32 per cent on average in PSE terms in the OECD
(or from 64 to 52 per cent when expressed as a nominal rate of producer
assistance ö see footnote 1), some countries began questioning whether
further cuts are warranted because that might lead to under-provision of
positive environmental externalities from farming.
Leaving aside the fact that PSEs have risen in the late 1990s, what are
those positive environmental externalities from farming? To what extent are
they joint products with farm outputs as distinct from being separable from
agricultural production per se? What about agriculture's negative environ-
mental externalities? What combination of policy measures would provide
society with the optimal amounts of not only marketed farm products but
also non-marketed environmental externalities?
5.1 Positive environmental externalities from farming
People raising `non-trade' concerns with respect to agriculture and the
environment acknowledge the fact that agriculture can be pollutive, but they
also argue that agriculture can contribute simultaneously in positive ways
to the environment (OECD 1997). They have in mind rural landscape and
biodiversity issues especially.
With respect to landscape, it is argued that society gets aesthetic pleasure
from seeing farmers continue to produce food and ¢bre domestically,
reminding them of part of their cultural heritage. Would that pleasure be
any less in the absence of price supports? The area farmed may decline
somewhat if farm prices fell (although by much less than the numbers of
farms and farmers); and a di¡erent mix of farm products may be marketed
as relative prices within agriculture change. But it is not possible to predict
whether the new uses for that land (for di¡erent farm activities, or for golf
courses, recreation parks and the like) would be any less aesthetically
pleasing than the current uses. Hence while there may be opinion surveys
showing that urban people enjoy the current rural landscape, that does not
rule out the possibility that those people would enjoy the public good
provided by the alternative landscape even more.
If a particular landscape such as alpine pastures or stone walls have been
clearly identi¢ed by society as something it is especially willing to pay to
have preserved in a particular area, the question arises as to whether the
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close quarters, tourist facilities might be built on such farms to cater for
them. That is despite the fact that scenery typically has the feature of a
public good. Can a case then be made for the government paying individuals
in that area to provide more of that public good in speci¢c ways? If so,
should only farmers, or anyone, be eligible to be paid for providing that
public good?
In the case of alpine pastures, it may be decided that payments must be
restricted to farmers because people want not only manicured pastures but
also cows on those pastures rather than just native animals (although that
con£icts with the objective of supporting wildlife habitats). In that case, what
form and level of payment is appropriate? Supporting the price of milk or
meat is not an e¤cient means of achieving that objective, not least because it
encourages greater use of all inputs in all grazing areas rather than just a
particular type of pasture management in a particular area identi¢ed for
preservation.
11 Indeed output price-support subsidies may well be counter-
productive: rational farmers if unconstrained would seek to make the most
of the price support by increasing stocking rates, which may ultimately
degrade rather than enhance the landscape. To avoid that would require yet
another intervention, namely tying price support to a restriction on stocking
rates per hectare. That would open up further scope for government failure,
not least in trying to identify the optimal stocking rate for each geographic
area from society's (as distinct from just the farmer's) viewpoint. Such a
scheme's main bene¢ciaries would be employees in the bureaucracy.
With respect to biodiversity, the argument is sometimes made that cuts
in farm price supports would lead to larger, more-specialised farms that
would tend to use a narrower range of plant species. There may be instances
where this is so, but equally there are cases where that has happened when
price supports have increased for certain products (as, for example, in the
United Kingdom after it joined the EEC in the early 1970s when farmers
received higher cereal prices under the CAP). Even if habitats were in danger
of being degraded as farmers adjusted to cuts in price supports, it needs to
be recognised that land would become cheaper and after-tax real income of
non-farm households would be greater following those cuts. Thus society
would be more able to a¡ord to provide purpose-built or restored habitats
for endangered species. Only if there were no cheaper way to provide such
habitats would it be appropriate to keep funding farm activities for that
11Again, if import restrictions rather than direct producer subsidies were to be used to
support product prices, a lower level of intervention would be required for the reasons given
in footnote 10.
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activity.
Decoupling support will almost certainly lead to a more successful
outcome at lower cost in terms of achieving society's speci¢c policy ob-
jectives. An example is paying a farmer to maintain a hedgerow, in place of
supporting the price of the crop grown on the adjacent land. The former
increases the probability that the farmer will continue to look after the
hedge; whereas the latter, through boosting the price of land, is more likely
to lead to the hedge being uprooted to provide more arable land, as
happened in the United Kingdom in the 1970s.
5.2 Negative environmental externalities from farming
Agricultural production in OECD countries generates a large number of
negative environmental externalities in the form of noise, air, soil, surface
water, and groundwater pollution. Those types of pollution ö and food
safety risks ö tend to be greater the greater the intensity of inputs such as
fertiliser, pesticides and shedding for livestock. That intensity of land-saving
input use in turn is highly correlated with the price of farm land, which is
higher the more densely populated a country and the higher its supports for
agricultural product prices. It happens that countries with the highest level
of agricultural price supports tend to have the least arable land per capita
and hence a strong comparative disadvantage in agriculture (Tyers and
Anderson 1992, p. 77). Hence we observe chemical applications in countries
such as Switzerland that are more than ten times that of countries such as
Argentina and Australia per hectare of farmland. The cutting of agricultural
protection and other forms of price support agreed to in the Uruguay Round
therefore may well be consistent with improving the rural environment. This
is so despite the response to those protection cuts in the form of farm
production expansion in less-protected countries, because most of the ex-
pansion is occurring in countries that are using far less intensive farming
methods (Anderson 1992; OECD 1998a).
Whether the domestic resources freed following a cut in farm price
supports are used in ways that are more pollutive (e.g. in urban industries,
with a concomitant increase in urban congestion) is an empirical question.
However, even if they were to move to more-pollutive industries, that could
be dealt with by having optimal urban environmental policies in place and
adjusting them as circumstances change. Likewise, if the expansion of
farming in less-protected countries following Uruguay Round implementa-
tion were to add to environmental damage in the rural areas of those
countries, that too could be dealt with best by their appropriate environ-
mental policy actions. This is a particular case of the general proposition that
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mental policies are in place to address the externalities (Anderson and
Blackhurst 1992).
5.3 Subsidies on farm inputs add to environmental degradation
Exacerbating the adverse environmental e¡ects of output price support
policies in some countries have been input price subsidies. It is true that in
recent years OECD governments have been dismantling many of the
subsidies to farm purchases of pollutive farm inputs such as fertilisers and
pesticides (OECD 1998b, pp. 32^3). Some signi¢cant ones remain, however,
including implicitly for irrigation water in the form of its under-pricing.
Replacing those subsidies with environmental taxes, charges (as with water
used for irrigation) or other ways of internalising the negative externalities
associated with their use is clearly desirable on environmental grounds. That
would be consistent with the polluter pays principle, and fully GATT/
WTO-legal. The level of those taxes/charges would need to be higher the
higher a country's farm product price supports, other things equal. This is
because the latter is equivalent to a subsidy for the use of all farm inputs,
including the pollutive ones. That additional penalty tax/charge on input use
could then be lowered as and when the level of output price support falls.
The URAA's `green box' currently allows governments not to have to
count, as part of their Aggregate Measure of Support, payments to farmers
under environmental programs, including payments made to cover the cost
or loss of income associated with complying with government environmental
programs (paragraph 12 of the URAA's Annex 2). This is an area where
more precision in the WTO rules might be desirable. Speci¢cally, should the
exempting of such payments when calculating the AMS be con¢ned to
practices where farmers are contributing positive environmental externalities
in the course of producing food? Presumably governments have less incentive
to adopt the polluter pays principle (PPP) in the agricultural sector now that
the URAA allows the exemption of payments ö which have become
widespread in the EU (see OECD 1998b, pp. 34^6) ö for adopting less-
pollutive farming practices so as to reduce negative environmental extern-
alities. An advantage of the PPP is that it is much simpler administratively:
it avoids the compliance monitoring required of programs in which payments
to farmers are contingent upon meeting speci¢c reductions in environmental
damage. If the PPP is seen as too harsh an imposition on farmers already
hurt by cuts in price supports, an alternative or additional government
initiative ö taken by numerous OECD countries in recent years ö involves
promoting voluntary community based co-operative schemes for learning
more about the environmental e¡ects of alternative farming methods.
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A related ecological issue has to do with the risk of importing food that
carries undesired exotic pests and diseases that could harm plants or animals.
Since this has been an issue throughout the several millennia in which food
has been traded internationally, ways to monitor and regulate that trade
have been developed. Through the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement,
the WTO recognises the importance of maintaining those checks where they
are scienti¢cally justi¢ed.
12 So long as the restrictiveness of the quarantine
regime is su¤cient (many would say it is often excessively restrictive),
13 this
concern has been dealt with and, incidentally, provides domestic farmers
with protection from import competition. It would thus be `double counting'
to claim this issue as a reason to further support farm product prices.
6. Viability of rural areas
Agriculture is a declining sector in relative terms in virtually all growing
economies. In that respect farms are similar to textiles and clothing factories,
blacksmith shops, small corner stores, and myriad other productive enter-
prises whose number tends to grow only slowly or even fall as a result of
changes in consumer spending, the adoption of labour-saving technologies,
and the exploiting of economies of scale as wages, incomes and expenditure
grow. Since so many sectors are adversely a¡ected by economic growth,
general rather than sector-speci¢c safety nets and adjustment assistance
packages are the most e¤cient and equitable ways to compensate potential
losers from economic development. Typically adjustment assistance would
involve a sizeable element of support for re-training.
Adjustments that cause the rural community to shrink, including those due
to agricultural policy reform, worry some societies, however (OECD 1998a).
This is not only because such adjustments reduce social cohesion and employ-
ment in rural areas. It may be also because rural villages hold some nostalgic
attraction for urban dwellers who may wish to visit the countryside from time
to time. Or it may be that depopulation of remote areas causes a sense of
military insecurity. What policy actions are appropriate in these circumstances?
And how do they impact on the rural communities of other countries?
12Our scienti¢c knowledge and capacity to assess those risks have never been better than
now. Even so, there is much room for improvement and many continue to question the
evidence that is brought to bear on cases.
13For example, it may be more cost-e¡ective to subsidise pre-shipment inspection, or
research and development to cope with an imported pest, than to prevent its importation by
restricting imports of the product that may carry it (James and Anderson 1998).
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Certainly, farming is located in rural areas, but rural economies are not
necessarily dominated by agriculture. In some (especially densely populated)
OECD countries, many of their rural areas are near urban areas and/or are
fortunate to have numerous non-farm economic activities. The prevalence of
part-time farming and the large share of farm household income earned o¡
the farm are testimony to the widespread existence of o¡-farm job
opportunities. This is especially true in Japan where less than one-¢fth of farm
household income is earned from farming, but that proportion is less than
one-half in numerous other OECD countries as well (OECD 1995). Thus
general price supports for agricultural production could be a quite ine¤cient
way to boost the relatively small proportion of left-behind regions.
If greater employment in poor rural areas is a policy objective, that goal
can be met more e¤ciently by subsidising all rural employment in those few
poor locations than by subsidising just farm employment (and simul-
taneously all other farm inputs) in all locations via farm output price
supports. Those other employment opportunities, which might be in other
primary sectors such as mining, or in manufacturing or service activities,
may even be more numerous than farm jobs in those rural areas.
6.2 Are targeted supports for essential services in remote areas an option?
There may be communities in some of the more remote rural areas of less-
densely populated countries, from where commuting to part-time o¡-farm
jobs is not feasible, whose survival is at risk following a cut in farm price
supports. A few areas may eventually be so de-populated that basic service
industries are no longer ¢nancially viable. Protecting farmers from general
price support cuts so as to reduce that prospect of implosion in just a few
areas is not a very e¤cient way to address this concern though. If the local
medical clinic and post o¤ce are all that are under threat to close in a
particular town, subsidies to them alone may be all that is necessary (but
even that possibility introduces moral hazard problems). Some targeted
subsidies to address the issue of declining service provision in remote areas
are WTO-consistent under the `green box' of the URAA (paragraph 2(g) of
Annex 2) and the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (Article 8.2(b)).
6.3 Regional supports in some countries can harm rural areas of other countries
Protecting farmers via price supports so as to slow the demise of rural areas
in one set of countries simply ensures, through its e¡ect in depressing
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faster. As with price-insulating policies, this can cause support programs in
more and more countries to spiral upwards in beggar-thy-neighbour fashion,
something that is self-defeating. Does that not suggest a collective inter-
national solution is required, namely, to not include this among the reasons
to provide domestic support or import protection to farmers?
6.4 How best to obtain the optimal degree of support for rural areas?
As with the other two `non-trade' concerns discussed above, an assessment
is needed of the extent of the willingness of society to pay for the
preservation of some rural areas that otherwise might implode, and of the
costs of providing that preservation by various means, before the optimal
assistance package can be designed. But that package almost certainly would
not include the very blunt instrument of general support to prices of farm
products regardless of where in the country those goods are produced.
7. Conclusion
So-called `non-trade' concerns are becoming an issue in the WTO in
numerous areas, not just with respect to agriculture. They are a direct
consequence of the lowering or outlawing of trade distortions: with less
natural and governmental protection from import competition and less
export subsidies, domestic policies are becoming relatively more important
as determinants of the international competitiveness of certain industries.
Despite their `non-trade' adjective, these concerns need to be dealt with in
the WTO because they certainly can a¡ect trade. Ideally they should be
handled in the same way for all sectors (for example, under an expanded
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), but until that is done
they cannot be ignored in the up-coming agricultural negotiations that
formally got under way in March 2000.
These concerns are not really new, but they are being packaged a little
di¡erently than in the past. A key question at stake is: do they require
exceptional treatment or are WTO provisions su¤cient to cater for them, for
example via the URAA's `green box'? The short answer based on the above
analysis appears to be that WTO provisions are adequate for dealing with
the main cases raised.
Some of the more speci¢c conclusions from this brief review are worth
stressing. First, several policy instruments will be necessary to address the
numerous policy objectives encompassed in the `non-trade' concerns
e¤ciently (which means directly and precisely). General agricultural price
support programs are not among the e¤cient measures. This is true even of
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export subsidies (which also distort consumer prices), because ö to use the
surgical analogy ö they are far too blunt to e¤ciently achieve the speci¢c
objectives involved.
With respect to food security, much more e¤cient policy instruments than
import barriers for boosting it above that provided under free markets are
subsidies to stockholding of staple foods. That is already allowed for in
Annex 2 of the URAA. Import restrictions to boost self-su¤ciency, far from
helping, may even diminish food security for vulnerable groups struggling
to pay the high price of protected domestic food. And once bound tari¡s are
lowered to applied rates so that there is no longer scope to raise applied rates
when international prices fall, greater stability in international food markets
will prevail which will boost that dimension of food security in all parts of
the world.
Environmental protection has many facets and so requires a range of
policy instruments. Reducing farm output price supports, as under the
URAA, probably provides the single biggest potential contribution to the
rural environment in agricultural-protectionist OECD countries, through
lowering the level and intensity of farm production. While those supports are
still in the process of being phased down, there should be additional taxes,
charges or other regulations on pollution from farm inputs to ensure any
extra damage caused by their encouragement via output price supports is
appropriately dealt with. Such taxes are of course permitted under WTO
rules. In so far as agriculture provides positive externalities or public goods,
appropriate policies are de-coupled payments for their speci¢c provision to
the optimal level in each location (assuming that optimal level is above the
level that would otherwise prevail, bearing in mind the marginal social cost
of further provision). Since most of those goods can be provided in-
dependently of farming per se, de-coupling is not only possible but also
desirable, because non-farmers may be able to provide some of those goods
or services at lower cost than farmers. Some provision for such payments is
made both in the URAA and in the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures.
Ensuring the viability of rural areas also is a laudable goal, but again the
blunt instrument of general farm product price supports is far from optimal,
particularly since agriculture is not even the dominant source of income in
many (particularly near-urban) rural areas. Far more appropriate are WTO-
consistent targeted adjustment assistance (including re-training) packages
and perhaps subsidies to the cost of capital for essential services that would
otherwise be withdrawn from strategic left-behind remote areas.
In short, WTO rules and URAA reform commitments are not at all
incompatible with e¤cient measures for addressing the so-called `non-trade'
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meeting domestic policy objectives on the one hand and agricultural
protection reform objectives as embodied in WTO rules on the other.
However, it needs to be recognised that some re-instrumentation of farm
support measures is inevitable and is already emerging as traditional
measures (tari¡s, export subsidies and domestic price supports) are phased
down. It is possible that some WTO members will wish to see the list of
`green box' measures expanded. Careful scrutiny of the grounds for any such
additions is likely to be a high payo¡ activity for economic analysts and
trade negotiators in the period ahead.
Both exporting and import-competing countries should welcome closer
scrutiny of instruments used for addressing `non-trade' concerns (or
achieving `non-economic' objectives, to use the 1980s' phrase). This is partly
because once those superior instruments are identi¢ed and adopted at closer
to optimal levels, greater food security and environmental protection will
result. But perhaps equally importantly, the current blunt instruments of
support to farm product prices could then be dismantled more rapidly, as
there would be even less reason to maintain them. Consumers, taxpayers and
exporters of non-farm products in the countries protecting farmers, together
with the world's more-e¤cient farmers, could then join with those anxious
to conserve global resources in celebrating the improvements in the manage-
ment of our economy and environment.
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